

Qaqutsa Cholokashvili's Ties with the North Caucasus (1923, June-November)

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Abstaract

The represented work refers to the armed resistance which took place in August-September 1922, one year after the occupation of Georgian Democratic Republic by the Soviet Russia (1918-1921). The resistance movement took place in Dusheti administrative region and mountainous region of Pshav-Khevsureti. It was led by Georgian Democratic Republic Army cavalry Division 1st company commander, colonel Qaikhosro (Qaqutsa) Cholokashvili who was brought up in Sighnaghi administrative region (now Akhmeta region) village Matani. Beginning from March 12, 1922, with his fellow warriors and friends, who were known by the name “shefitsulebi” – sworn men, or “those who fought under the oath,” was camped in the forest. Unfortunately, the resistance was defeated.

This work deals with the ties between Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and his combatants with the North Caucasus from June 1923 till November 1923, through the comparatively large and full investigation. This issue is thoroughly investigated using the source documents, emigrant literature and new archive documents which were considered from the new viewpoint, critically and objectively.

The main result of the investigation is that when studying and analyzing the resistance movement in Georgia in 1921-1923, which was aimed to restore independence of Georgia, besides the early known documents, large number of the archive materials being unknown and unpublished till our days, have been now investigated, studied and used to analyze the mentioned important period of time in the Georgian historiography. Those materials mainly refer to the ties between the Georgian movement leader Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and the North Caucasus leaders.

In relation with the situation formed nowadays in the North Caucasus, the scientific work has its practical as well as theoretical importance.

Key words: *Qaqutsa Cholokashvili, Ali Mitaev, Atabai Umaev, Aleksander Sul Khanishvili.*

Introduction

Unfortunately, for various reasons, it was not able till nowadays to perform thorough scientific studies of these important historical issue of the modern history of Georgia. The political climate existing for many years in the Soviet Union, it was impossible to carry on real historical scientific researches concerning the important events taking place in the period from 1921 till 1989 in the Soviet Republics. The negative influence of the Soviet ideology was especially sharp upon the comprehension of the modern epoch historical events. This fault mostly influenced the modern history of Georgia. It was taught using one methodology, one standard – Soviet principles of “creating standardized history” of the Soviet Republics really resembled the process of creating false myths. The “fairy tales” were written containing false facts; everything was studied under the dictate of the false ideology called “the only true ideology in the world.” The Soviet historiography was false, it was written on the basis and in the light of the governing communist party ideological theses, the „wise and historically important conclusions and provisions of the Communist Party Central Committee; history was being written according the principles of “socialist realism” –desired conditions were told as reality. All those processes were aimed to show that the social progress in Georgia was led by Bolshevism and by the Soviet power under which the renaissance of Georgia, its history, culture and further development, its historical dreams about better future became the reality. Alongside with this propaganda, everything was strongly based on the immoral foundation for class struggle generalization. Naturally, altogether, the results of such approach were pitiful. Till the modern time, the vast amount of the archive documents were unknown for Soviet researchers. Many of them were classified, tabooed and practically out of reach, so that nobody could reject or doubt “the great deeds of the communist party in Georgia”. The strict classification of the documents was necessary to convince people that communist party was the leader and organizer of the great success of Georgia and the “savior” of the country. The falsification of history, bringing the false data into the scientific works was used to strengthen influence of the communist party, to portrait the deeds of the communist leaders as great

merits to the Country, to attract people's attention and deserve trusting from the large number of population. In such circumstances the researchers of historical events were not able to study the events taking place in Georgia in 1921-1924, to show them as the sanguinary events, the crimes against the nation. The works of the Georgian historians of those times could not escape pressing from the communist government and they were not able to protect their professional ethics. The history researchers of the time tried to avoid not even thorough investigation of the mentioned period and that was the best they could do, but they did not ever speak about those times at all. Otherwise they would be arrested and even murdered for telling the truth about the beginning years of the Soviet power in Georgia. The other did discuss the mentioned period but this was a tendentious interpretation (L. Ghogoberidze, Georgian emigration and the activities of the anti-soviet parties, Tiflis, 1927; K. Sulakvelidze – who organized the rebellion and how, 1927; P. Lomashvili, From the history of Georgian emigration, Tb. 1965). The mentioned period of time is reflected in the “Outline of Georgian History”, vol. VII in which the issue of struggling for national independence was not discussed fully and appropriately. The most part of the historical studies dedicated to the victory of Soviet power in Georgia aimed to prove that there were subjective and objective preconditions for the victory of the socialist revolution and “popular uprising” took place against the Democratic Republic government (1918-1921). The soviet Georgian historians called the process of resurrection of the national identity as “bourgeois nationalism” and the anti-Bolshevik movement of 1921-1924 including the uprising of August 1924 – as “Menshevik adventure.”

Only after publicity and democratism was restored it became possible to ruin Soviet stereotypes and objective appraisal to the past. After decomposition of the Soviet Union and restoring independence of Georgia (1991) it became possible to discuss the XX century history of Georgia objectively.

Today the interest towards history is globally increasing. Within the conditions of strengthening the democratic principles and national freedom, the importance of right and real understanding and using the history facts are also increased. The political system does not anymore hinder this process, the stereotypes are broken down and every nation can assess its history objectively and fully, basing on the principles of morality. In the given conditions we, the historians of Georgia, are obliged to investigate our history. Our historiography should depict every event - the visible or invisible (inner peripetia of our history, our national identity, cultural and traditions). It is essential that new generations get familiar with the history of their country in its real, unbiased way free of cliché. Many important and interesting works and monographs are published concerning the interesting period of the

Georgian history (1921-1924) (for example: Sh. Vadachkoria - The Notion of the National State in the Georgian political thinking (1921-1923), Tb. 1999; L. Toidze- Political History of Georgia (1921-1923); Tb. 1999); R. Kverenchkhiladze - Way of Torture, Execution, Exiling, Persecution. (Book 1, Tb. 1999); N. Kirtadze – Armed Uprising in Georgia, 1924, (Kutaisi 1996); N. Kirtadze -the Europe and Independent Georgia (1919-1923), Tb. 1997; G. Tskhovrebadze - Georgian Political Emigration and the Issue of Independence of Georgia in 1921-1925, Tb. 1996) and others...

After the independence of Georgia had been restored the interest towards the newest history of Georgia grew up. This was conditioned by two factors. 1. Having discarded communist ideological clichés made it possible to have objective knowledge about past; 2. In the recent years several classified documents saved in the archives and other material of the Soviet era became available. Memoirs of Georgian emigrants, scientific works of the emigrant Georgian historians and the periodicals (Georgian emigrant press is relatively free from the censorship influence) which gave a possibility to think in the other way and regard our real history, to break down the Soviet stereotypes, to view the historical events in different way. Today the worldview principles are radically different, the historical research methodology and methodology have changed during the years of the communist ideology, social and class affiliations and alongside with this, all the facts were changed and shown only in the light of the communist ideology. Everything was assessed only from the Soviet historiography positions. Nowadays the national ideology dominates and the leading position is held by national ideology. In historiography national and general humanitarian principles dominate. The scientific criteria are not dictated by the interests of leading class but only by general humanistic morality principles, for which the dominant meaning goes not to one or another class and its governing position, but to national interests.

Analyzing the events of 1921-1924 on the basis of the works, articles and memories, searching through the Soviet historiography, European scientists and Georgian emigrants, we found ourselves against a complex dilemma. Here the decisive word about this matter is to the today's generation of the researchers who are free of any kind of censorship influences and human prejudices. This generation can reach the deep and scientifically based results of the analysis.

The initial sources for such investigations are the works of the historians about the Soviet period in Georgia. Special interest should be paid to the documents from the archives of the State Security Committee former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (in Russian abbreviation *КГБ*), studied and published by professor Nestan Kirtadze ("Where is your brother, Cain?...") (Bloodstained pages of the Georgian history (1921-1930); Tb. 1998).

The novelty and the first sources for the represented paper are the following archive documents (labeled as “**secret**,” “**top secret**” and “**for perpetual storage**”): from the archives of the Ministry of the internal affairs of the Georgian Soviet-Socialist Republic; the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Georgian Soviet-Socialist Republic (Archives of the Party); the archives of the former People’s Commissariat of the Internal Affairs (then Ministry of the Internal Affairs) of Georgian Soviet-Socialist Republic; and) the archives of the former Extraordinary Commission of Georgia(Russian abbreviation “**ЧК**“-**„Чрезвычайная Комиссия**“), then the archives of the State Committee of the National Security of Georgia (Georgian abbrev. *საგგ* - Russian - *КГБ*), so called “security archives.”

There is also one more first source’ it is very important material from the central state archives of the modern history of Georgia: the archives of the former people’s commissariat (then the ministry of the internal affairs) of Georgia and the former “Extraordinary commission” of Georgia (all labeled as “**secret**,” “**top secret**” and “**for perpetual storage**”); fund #285 (correspondence between people’s Commissariat “ and “the Extraordinary Commission of Georgia(Russian „**ЧК**“-**„Чрезвычайная Комиссия**“)) on combating banditry”: “On combating Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and others whose activities are observed in Telavi, Borchalo and other regions of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia”: direct call between the head of the “Extraordinary commission”, Kvantaliani and the head of the Department of combating banditry, Khumarov from one side, and the head of the same department in Telavi, Mchedlidze, on other side; August 3, 1923; time 5. 00 in the evening”; also other documents such as: „a post telegram **absolutely secret**; Tbilisi, from the “Extraordinary Commission” of Trans-Caucasus to the department of combating banditry; a copy of this sent to Caucasian special army intelligence service and another copy to the People’s Commissariat of the internal affairs, personally from the extraordinary commission on “combating banditry”: a)operative intelligence survey on May 14 and 15, 1923, #77, about the bandit groups , on 15 may, about 16 o’clock. b) Operative intelligence survey on 6 and 7 of September 1923 #132, about 16. 00, 7th of September; c) operative intelligence survey on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 1923, # 137; and on September 21, at 16, 00. 3. „Post telegram, top secret,Tbilisi, the Transcaucasus Extraordinary Commission, the combating banditry department, a copy to the Extraordinary Army Intelligence Department and another copy to the Caucasus Army Intelligence People’s Commissariat, from the combating banditry department of the Georgian Extraordinary Commission; from the 2nd Division of the Counter-Intelligence Department of the Extraordinary Commission. Operational Intelligence Survey #142 (exceptional), on the bands activities, 25 October, 1923) and Fund #600 (The Council of

the People's Commissars (Council of ministers of the Georgian SSR), the years 1922 - 1995. „Records of Investigations, 1923, 3 May, Telavi).

The memoirs about “sworn brothers” and their struggle, by the former combatant of Qaikhosro (Gaqutsa) Cholokashvili, Alexander Sulkhaniashvili, a representative of the Georgian emigration abroad, are considered the prime sources for the given issue. (Sulkhaniashvili A.I., My Memories, San-Francisco, USA, 1981).

Research Methods and Discussion

To study the presented issue the modern research methodology was used: comparative-historical, analytical and synthetical methods. Great number of the new documents were put forth to the scientific investigation; such as published or unpublished documents, memoirs, which belong to the primary sources. All those documents were critically studied and analyzed using new methodology. The political and social-economical environment of second half of the XIX century and first twenties of the XX century, create subjective and objective preconditions for deconstruction of the Russian Empire. This brought national freedom to the people who were under the Russian power. Those circumstances promoted Georgia's independence and forming Georgian Democratic Republic which existed during 1918-1921.

Announcing the independence of Georgia on May 26, 1918 and forming the Democratic Republic had epochal importance in the History of Georgian nation. This act of history realized the supreme goal of Georgian national movement - reconstruction of the statehood of Georgia after 117 years of being Russian colony.

Being an independent country for only 3 years – it is really a very short time for the country's history, but in the history of Georgia's existence as a country and its struggle for independence, the years 1918-1921 were called “a short golden era” not only politically but as a perspective for heroic struggle, courage, fighting capacity striving for freedom and seeing better perspectives.

After the events of February-March 1921, the Soviet Russia, according own imperialistic and ideological interests, terminated the existence of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) having violated the peaceful alliance agreement of May 7, 1920 between Russia and Georgia and aggressively occupied the country which had earlier been recognized. Then this act was followed by annexation and the members of the Democratic Government and some military men emigrated from the country.

The Soviet Russia, through its annexation and occupation, physically destroyed the independent republic of Georgia which at that time was on its way to democracy and development. It was the second time that Russia put the burden of subjugation under the power of the Soviet Empire.

The mentioned events conditioned the liberation movement aiming to restore independence of the country. This movement expressed the wishes of the majority of the Georgian nation. Among other important historical events, the liberation movement of 1921-1924 has always had its important place and influence in the history despite the official Soviet government of that time announced those three years of the heroic struggle as “political banditry.”

Three years later since the fact of occupation of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) by the Soviet Russia in 1922, there a peaceful people protests and peaceful demonstrations against the Bolshevik power took place. In August-September of the same 1922 year, the armed uprising exploded in Dusheti district and Pshav-Khevsureti mountainous region of Georgia. This uprising was led by Georgian Democratic Republic Army cavalry Division 1st company commander, colonel Qaikhosro (Qaqtusa) Cholokashvili who was brought up in Signaghi region (now Akhmeta) village Matani. Cholokashvili had moved to the forest with his combatants since March 12, 1922. In practice, the armed revolt was coordinated by inter-partial union settled in May 1922, named as “Joined Committee for Georgian Independence” and the Military Centre associated with this committee. Unfortunately, this revolt was defeated. .

In spring 1923, Qaqtusa Cholokashvili began preparations for the intended new uprising (Kirtadze, 1998:324). Pankisi gorge was selected as the place for collecting the armed formations. According the order by Qaqtusa Cholokashvili of April 27, 1923 according the documents of the Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:129, there are the names of some of them (Qaqtusa Cholokashvili, Giorgi Gverdtsiteli, Ioseb Kakhashvili, Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili, Sergo Maisuradze, Malakia Maisuradze, Mikha Khelashvili and others (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 600: 29), Taras Chkhetiani, Vano Kharangosishvili, Luka Kvaliashvili, Vaso Kandelaki and others (Sul Khanishvili, 1981;100). five combatants from Qizikhi, nine ethnically Qists (Datiko [pareulidze]- E.N.). and many others. All combatants were divided into five groups. The first group, four men: Giorgi Gverdtsiteli, Gabo Oziashvili, Lelo Chiqovani and Giorgi Bidzinashvili were sent to Dusheti in order to help twelve-man group led by Kakhiashvili to go to the Pankisi gorge. The second group led by Misha Natsvlishvili (Malakia Maisuradze, Alexandre Badurashvili and others) was sent to Qizikhi through Jimiti forest, to help the group led by Molashvili to reach

Pankisi. Three men (Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili, Sergo Maisuradze and Mikha Khelashvili) were sent to Gombori region village Ashroshani, to help Dimitri Tsiskarauli nearby to the village Eniseli (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:129) and finally to pass to Pankisi gorge too (E.N.). The fourth group (four men) - Roman Kanchaveli and three Qist combatants had to wait for others in Pankisi, at the place of meeting. The fifth group (eight men) under the command of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili (Soso Losaberidze, Ioseb Kakhashvili, the two brothers – Chesalo and Makhman, Makhmed Imedashvili, Qosa from Omalo village (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 285: 129), Cholokashvili's assistant Staff Captain Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgian Republic. Archives of the Party, 14a:16) Shaliko (E.N.) Kandelaki – were sent from Pankisi to Telavu district village Sabue in order to have some negotiations with Lek people (Daghestan) so that they would be ready for the time Qaqutsa Cholokashvili would lead the cavalry unit of Chechens through the region (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 285: 129) .

Georgian Bolshevik government fought against their people, against the freedom and independence of the country. They came to power with help of the other country's forces. As soon as the rebels moved to forests the government announced them “bandits” and “robbers,” “agents” of the foreign intelligence and the “criminals.” The government then began opposing to the revolted forces by all the means including unlawful measures aiming to discredit the rebellions. They worked hard to pursue the population that Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and his sworn combatants, struggling for independence, were simply robbers and bandits. The communists killed their fellow members who were not desirable for them, they robbed the population of the villages and they accused the members of Cholokashvili's troops; many agents were sent to the units of revolted men. They were obliged to try to kill Cholokashvili, to rob the local population, to mislead the combatants into mousetraps, to pursue the local population to kill or betray the warriors, or to revolt against them but despite the intensive terror, the great majority of people did not betray the patriots; people believed in the ideals of Cholokashvili's forces. This can be exemplified by memories about Dimitri Tsiskarauli, the best liaison person living in Ashroshani, Telavi (now Akhmeta) region. Though there were also instances of betrayal and served for the communist intelligence service (“chekist”) commands.

In order to guarantee the aim of their rebellion movement, Qaqutsa Cholokashvili decided to establish ties with Chechnya and Daghestan to assure their support with manpower. Cholokashvili began negotiations with Atabai Umaev, Chechen by nationalit, and reached positive results. In a short while, Umaev informed Cholokashvili that there was

already gathered a large group of Chechen warriors ready to move to Georgia's region Kakheti but he would not be successful in this because the small groups of Tushi population (in the Georgian region Tusheti) did not allow the Chechens to make way through their region because they did not trust them and were afraid of disturbances. A little later at the end of June, 1923 Cholokashvili sent Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili to Atabai Umaev with same request (N. Kirtadze, 1998; 324). Sul Khanishvili was accompanied by a man whose name was Rostom (Qavtara) Bekuraidze, from Alvani village, Tusheti. This man could speak Chechen. Cholokashvili had preparatory discussions about what to talk with Chechens. He wrote a short letter to Umaev saying he was sending his assistant to him and asked for help in making talks with influential people not only with the groups of Chechens habituating in mountains or in valleys but as many other habitants of the regions as it was possible. The Georgian rebels were looking for gaining the ties with the people of the North Caucasus which was possible only with help of Chechens.

Sul Khanishvili delivered the letter written by Cholokashvili to Atabai Umaev. Umaev turned to be quite educated and a good orator. So that Sul Khanishvili was asked only a few questions about what they should do for the Georgian rebellions. (Sul Khanishvili, 1981: 106-107, 112, 114-115).

Atabai Umaev and Sul Khanishvili were walking in all the villages of the Itumkal region during two weeks and called meetings at which they were explaining to Chechen people why it was not only desirable for Georgians but also good for them to help Georgian people in their struggle. But because of keen opposition in face of real bandits as were Imedashvili and Andalashvili who presented at the meeting, the process of agitation failed. Sul Khanishvili and Umaev continued the attempts to find support from the Chechens. Atabai Umaev gave a special letter to Rostom Bakuraidze and sent him as a delegate to population of Tusheti to start new talks about letting the Chechen armed groups go towards Kakheti through Tusheti territory, to help Georgian rebellions. (Kirtadze, 1998: 324).

Sul Khanishvili got acquainted with Shamil Iqaidze, who was from Tusheti region and at that moment was in Chechnia having announced that he wanted to become a member of Georgian armed units of rebellions, who were known as "sworn men". Sul Khanishvili sent a letter to Cholokashvili with Shamil Iqaidze writing that the measures that he and Umaev were taking became gradually more intensive and fruitful and he was going to Urismartan to meet there with Sheikh Ali Mataev. before Shamil returned from Georgia, Atabai Umaev sent a amn to Ali Miatev saying that a driend and representative of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili wanted to meet with him. Ali Mitaev agreed and thus, Sul Khanishvili and Mitaev went to Chechnia's valley region. (Sul Khanishvili, 1981: 118).

At the night 4/5 May, 1923, one communist killed the assistant officer of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili in Telavi, staffs-captain Shaliko Kandelaki. After that, Vano Karangozishvili was appointed as assistant officer (Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgian Republic; archives of the party 14 a: 16). According the note of the “special three men” or so called “troika” (in Russ.) who were combating against national movement which they called “banditry”, Vano Karangozishvili and Luka Kvaliashvili were killed on August 14, in Tusheti (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:233).

Answering the letter dated by June 20, according the direction of the central committee of the National-Democratic Party, in the letter sent on July 7, Giorgi Tsinamdzgvrishvili wrote to Cholokashvili and Karangozishvili (the letter was headed as “to the leaders of partisans):

„...1) the information you have sent is not sufficient. We need more precise data about your relations with the population of the mountainous regions, with whom do you have ties among Dagestanis, Chechens and Qists; approximately what amount of manpower they can put forward, what about weaponry and horses. Deliver us this information with Qaqutsa, before you return from Qisteteti region.

2) we inform you that we are having negotiations with Azerbaijan and Mountain republic about revolting, and with Turkey as well. We inform you also that these negotiations are going on successfully and we may expect the activities quite soon. You are obliged to keep this information secret. All that concern the number of partisans, negotiations with Dagestan people and all the information delivered by us are secret. Only you personally ought to know. We repeat: nobody should know anything about military preparations.... The military centre will send you our military plan at the due time but you should now send someone who is responsible to get the wanted information from you and to take the necessary information from us Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgian Republic. Archives of the Party, 14a, description 1, fund 14a.:16).

This letter was with the courier sent by Tsinamdzgvrishvili to Cholokashvili, whose surname was Petriashvili. He was arrested by the Extraordinary Coomission (“Cheka”). (Kirtadze, 1998: 324).

At the end of July or the beginning of August 1923, Cholokashvili sent a letter too Tsinamdzgvrishvili with the courier, who was obliged to tell Georgian national-democrats thar Cholokashvili suggested that it was already high time to begin the uprising in the mountainous region with the help of the Ingush and Dagestani troops. Tsinamdzgvrishvili answered with the letter saying that neither Cholokashvili nor Ingush or Daghestani armed men could deciide the precise time of beginning the uprising for the reason that this uprising

could only be of additional help in case the relations between Russia and Europe would face difficulties (Kirtadze, 1998,:324).

What were the preconditions or the key for Georgia, to combat and to gain victory in the 20-ies of the XX century? The following conditions show on what circumstances it depended whether Georgia could win or lose:

Full national-political unity of the Georgian people on the ground of restoring national independence, using the united efforts of all the political parties, establishing unified coordinating political authority and unifying all the political forces of Georgia, moral and practical support from the world's society, especially West Europe, support from the different governments and non-governmental forces, inner changes in political and social fields, inner democratic innovations, founding democratic freedoms and values, coming the democratic forces to power; besides that, app the factora of the foreign policy would have influenced Soviet Russia; world peaceful and democratic forces' efforts in order Bolshevik Russia would have to withdraw its troops from Georgia , possible intervention of the European countries military forces into Russia and free not only Georgia but other trans-Caucasian and North Caucasian national countries through the participation of their forces in the united armed uprising against the imperial Russia and the colonial policy in the Caucasus – these were the keys to the independence.

Georgia could not oppose Russia without the help of other Gaugasian nations. Even in case of consolidation all the Georgian resources, armed opposition against Russia was a lost battle from the beginning.

the potential allies of Georgia in its hard struggle against Russian occupation could be European countries and the immediate neighbor countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia and North Caucasus republics. Besides, even to test its position and nothing more, in respect with its neutral position, it was very important for the Georgian centre of rebellion against Russia to have talks with Turkey. Thus, three preconditions for Georgian rebellions to achieve success were the following: consolidation with the neighbor countries of Caucasus; financial, diplomatic and active combat support from the West European countries; being sure about neutral position of Turkey.

Ali Mitaev hosted Aleksandre Sul Khanishvili and Atabai Umaev very friendly. The talks first were led by Atabai Umaev in their native language. Then Sul Khanishvili addressed Ali Mitaev with the following words: „...you know it quite well that Russia always had benefit out of minor or more serious conflicts and hostilities between Caucasian nations. Russia always promoted aggravations of relations between the neighbors... Today the political mistakes of our ancestors and our generation became clear for us and we know that these

mistakes proved costly. When Shamil was struggling against Russia, unfortunately, though a little part, but nevertheless, a part of Georgians were on the Russian side. All the Caucasian nations should have been united against Russia. But you can remember what were the relations between Dagestan and Georgia: when Georgia fought against any enemy, Dagestan men always stabbed us in the back; they captured Georgian women and men and children. Alongside with the Russian propaganda, this fact was also one of the reasons that Georgia did not support the movement of Shamil. Please, do not think that I am justifying this fact, just the opposite. I am very sorry that our ancestors were not able to foresee that Russia was our common enemy and their mistakes became hard burden for us. Caucasian nations are very much alike each other by our traditions, our respect to honest and brave people, our ideals. The only difference is our religion. South Caucasus population is Christians and North Caucasus – Muslims. But this is not a reason to hinder our friendship and serving our own country or common interests? We have Muslim Georgians too among our native population and this is not a negative factor for our integrity. Today I have come to you as I am sent by my leader who is trying to continue the traditions of struggling begun by our ancestors and by Shamil, I want to ask you as a very influential man in the North Caucasus, to deliver our message expressing our wishes and strive: let us end with past oppositions and hostilities; as they do not match with our ideals and hinder liberation of our countries” (Sul Khanishvili, 1981:119-122, 125).

It turned out that Ali Mitaev thought the same way. He took establishing ties with neighboring people upon himself;

As soon as he returned from Dagestan Sul Khanishvili wrote a letter to Qaqutsa Cholokashvili describing in details the negotiations with Ali Mitaev and other noble men of North Caucasus.

On 26 of July, 1923 Alexandre Sul Khanishvili went out from Chechnia with 500-700 Chechens, aiming to move to Georgia, Kakheti region.

He requested from Tushi population to let him pass through the checkpoint promising that Chechens would do no harm to them, neither concerning their cattle nor other property. He explained that he was accompanied by Chechens and was going to Kakheti region to combat against the Soviet power. Inhabitants of Tusheti didn't hinder him and Sul Khanishvili, accompanied by Chechens went through Tuxhareti passing to Omalo village heights and to Pankisi gorge where they planned to join Cholokashvili's troops and would begin military activities in Kakheti. The route by which Sul Khanishvili was planning to go was as follows: from one direction – through Velisi ridge and from the other – Naqerala ridge, meeting at Didi Zgverdi height, crossing the river Ortskali, go to the mountain Shamfuris tsveri, then

through the villages Lanshturia, Parta, Drevi, Chkoni until reaching Karigo pass(central archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285: 82). But when Tushi population knew that Chechens would pass their territories they became negatively affected. They were afraid that Chechens would rob their cattle. In the middle of August Cholokashvili was informed that Chechens could not come to Kakheti through Tusheti region again, it was then the second turn. Chechens returned to their homes. (Kirtadze, 1998: 324).

In August, Qakhosro Cholokashvili went to Chechnia accompanied with five “sworn” combatants. Two days later Qaqutsa, Atabai and Sul Khanishvili went to meet Ali Mitaev. After this meeting they went to Grozno, where they met with three local noble men and decided to begin uprising. At that meeting the decision was made about signing an official agreement. For this purpose Giorgi Tsinamdzgvrishvili was to arrive from Tbilisi. Besides, it was decided that qualified military officers, as many as possible, should have been sent from Georgia as there were only a few number of the local professional military men. The plan of the campaign should have been laid out in Tbilisi and then submitted to the Caucasian commanders (Sul Khanishvili, 1981;127, 129).

Qakhosro Cholokashvili contacted with Atabai Umaev and with his help, to the influential imam of Daghestan Naadjimudin Gatsinski whose official influence spread over Andy region of Daghestan and the centre for his agitation was the living place of Atabai Umaev, village Tumsoi (Chechnia). In the same month of August, Cholokashvili went to Gatsinski with his 7 or 8 combatants. Gatsinski helped him in agitation among the Chechen population (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia 285:289).

In one of his letters sent in August 1923, Cholokashvili wrote to Tsinamdzgvrishvili that it was wrong not to try to have contacts with North Caucasus the population of which could have a huge influence if they served this idea. He also mentioned in this letter that he used to be in Chechnya himself and had a talk with one of the most influential men Sheikh Ali Mitaev who promised his help in struggle of the Georgian patriots against Russian occupation and in realizing the plans of the rebellion. Cholokashvili advised Tsinamdzgvrishvili to have close contacts with Mitaev and sent him his address and the “code word” (Kirtadze, 1998:323).

In September 1923, Tsinamdzgvrishvili addressed the presidium of the central committee of the National-Democratic party (Shalva Amiredjibi, Iason Djavakhishvili and Mikheil Ishkneli) saying: „As early as tomorrow, we are going to Ali Mitaev”. They agreed. The departure was confirmed by the “Military commission” affiliated to “parity committee”. Almost the same time, Konstantine Karangozishvili went the same direction. At that time he was a trusted man of Tsinamdzgvrishvili. Tsinamdzgvrishvili left him there and returned back in about ten days. He reported about his “voyage” at the meeting of the central committee of

the National-Democratic party. Tsinamdzgvrishvili said that he had met Ali Mitaev, studied the situation in Chechnya and warranted that this man was a holy person and had unlimited influence over Chechens and the Chechen in mass were “good material” for the armed rebellion, needing only a good command. Ali Mitaev himself agreed to have contacts with the “parity committee” in order to begin armed rebel. He promised to activate a number of military troops only asking for about 50 officers sent from Georgia as the instructors for Chechen forces. When having talks, Tsinamdzgvrilshi and Ali Mitaev touched the question of working with Dagestanis and Kazaks. Tsinamdzgvrishvili found out that there was a kind of rival between Mitaev and Dagestani Imam Nadjimudin Gatsinski because of the areas of influences. He asked Mitaev to forget about rival and Mitaev wrote a letter to Gatsinski telling about the aim of their consolidation and the perspectives of the rebellion.

Tsinamdzgvrishvili reported the results of his voyage to the Minister of agriculture in the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Noe Khomeriki, a member of the Social-Democratic party of Georgia who had arrived from Paris illegally (Kirtadze, 1998:323) Khomeriki informed the head of the “Parity Committee” (Kirtadze, 1998, 323) a member of the Social-Democratic party Konstantine Andronikashvili. Thus, the presidium of the “Parity Committee” knew about the activities and they decided not to cut the contacts with the North Caucasus but for that time to refrain from sending 50 officers to Caucasus because of lack of finances. After a while, a messenger from Chechnya, from Ali Mitaev arrived to Giorgi Tsinamdzgvrishvili and brought a letter from Konstantine Karangozishvili. Among other things, there was a request to speed up the issue about sending 50 Georgian officers (Kirtadze, 1998; 323).

In September 1923, Cholokashvili moved to Daghestan through the Sabue forest and Gombori Passover, accompanied with the friends and sworn combatants: Giorgi Gverdtsiteli, Malaqia Maisuradze, Misha Natsvlishvili, Soso Losaberidze, Aleksander Badurashvili and Roman Kanchaveli. He came to Antsa Katsaev, had negotiations there, with someone, under the surname Rajhudin who was well known person in Caucasus. The other combatants – Longo Tsikhistavi, Alex Feiqrishvili, Ioseb Qimbarishvili, Giorgi (“Kurdghela”) Bidzinashvili and Sasha Chiabrishvili were at that time in Dusheti region, in Akhatani (Choporti district). On September 11 Aleksandre Badurashvili and Roman Kanchaveli returned from Cholokashvili, through Akhmeta to Omalostavi village, They intended to move on to Dusheti district to deliver the messages to Longo Tsikhistavi and his group that things were going on well. After 14 of September about 35 of the “sworn men” returned to Georgia in some small groups. Only Alexandre Sul Khanishvili rested in Chechnya, in the Tumsoi village, with Atabai Umaev (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285: 265).

In the beginning of October Cholokashvili moved from Daghestan to Atabai Umaev, whom he left on October 8 and returned to Telavi region. Aleksandre Sulhanishvili returned from Chechnya to Georgia with him. The ties between Cholokashvili and Gatsinski were interrupted since the 15th of October because of the unfavorable weather conditions (Central state archives of the modern history of Georgia, 285:289).

Results. Qaqutsa Cholokashvili; relations with the North Caucasus (May 1923-November 1923) is one of the outstanding facts in the centuries history of the Georgian national movement and its important period of time, the years of 1921-1924.

In the today's situation, guaranteed state and national security is logically related to the thorough study and generalization of our history, where the important place belongs to the events of 1921-1924. It becomes obvious if we attentively revise the historical events. We can see that many issues of the political events of our days can be matched with the past. Based on the above said we can conclude that the nearest past and modern geopolitical events and situations can be compared and many common problems can be found: Russian-Georgian armed conflicts, "informational war", occupation of Georgian territories - Apkhazeti and Samachablo, participating of the armed troops from the North Caucasus, so called "boeviks: against Georgia, worsening of interrelations between Georgia and North Caucasus, and many other factors, such as no circumstances to allow to have peaceful "diplomatic" talks, to explain that Russia is our common enemy and the inspirator of all conflicts, violator of the fundamental juridical norms and principles – such situation can be used in order to make useful propaganda of the historical events which we have discussed here – Qaqutsa Cholokashvili and his combatants and to show the historical past in connection with modern problems. In our opinion, the armed combating against Russian occupation, the attempts to have ties with Caucasian people – Chechens, Ingush, Dagestan people, Kazaks living on the banks of the river Tergi, underlying that they had the attempts to join with Georgian troops and to fight with them – all the events we have discussed in this work of course should be talked about and should be assessed positively.

During many centuries, the only guarantee for the independence of Georgia always was, is and will be only consciousness of the Georgian people as the pillar on which the idea of freedom can be rest is the perception of freedom and independence which is what the Georgian people never lack in general and this is confirmed by gratitude from the next generations towards the heroes of the national movement of 1921-1924.

Today we are on the hard way to full political independence of Georgia and our nation pays due attention and respect to the heroic past, namely the national movement and uprising of

1921-1924 against occupation under the leadership of Qaqutsa Cholokashvili who made a sacrifice of his life for the ideals of independence of Georgia

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